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    <title>topic Re: NAC bypass with Basilisk - Automatic Ethernet Ghosting in Network Access Control</title>
    <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-access-control/nac-bypass-with-basilisk-automatic-ethernet-ghosting/m-p/5557781#M600555</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi REJR77,&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;The reason Basilisk works: 802.1X (EAP-TLS included) only authenticates the session at the start — it never checks that later frames really come from that endpoint. The tool bridges in transparently, lets the real device finish EAP-TLS, then rides the session by cloning its MAC and IP.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;That's also why port-security, DHCP snooping, DAI and IP Source Guard all miss it — the attacker reuses the legitimate MAC/IP, so every binding still looks consistent.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;The only hard stop is the one you named: &lt;STRONG&gt;MACsec (802.1AE/MKA, host-to-switch via Secure Client + ISE)&lt;/STRONG&gt; — it protects every frame cryptographically, so an inline device can't inject without the keys. Limit is coverage: printers, IoT, older NICs.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Where MACsec can't reach, assume bypass is possible and detect by behaviour, not identity:&lt;/P&gt;&lt;UL&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;STRONG&gt;ISE profiling + Secure Network Analytics (Stealthwatch)&lt;/STRONG&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/SPAN&gt;— flag the "printer" that suddenly scans or runs SSH/SMB, then CoA-quarantine it via pxGrid.&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Keep exposed ports on tight ACLs; shut or blackhole unused ones.&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;/UL&gt;&lt;P&gt;Bottom line: MACsec where you can, behavioural detection + physical security everywhere else. No switch add-on reliably catches a clean transparent bridge on its own — by design it looks exactly like the host it's hiding behind.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 09:02:43 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>olasupoo</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2026-06-10T09:02:43Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>NAC bypass with Basilisk - Automatic Ethernet Ghosting</title>
      <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-access-control/nac-bypass-with-basilisk-automatic-ethernet-ghosting/m-p/5557779#M600554</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hello,&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Some tools like Basilisk can permit attacker to bypass NAC (event EAP-TLS)&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;A href="https://ringtail.ch/products/basilisk-automatic-ethernet-ghosting" target="_blank"&gt;Basilisk - Automatic Ethernet Ghosting – Ringtail Security&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Is there a way to detect these type of device on the network and block them with ISE or directly with the switch (witht some security add on)&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;the fist thing I can see would be to use Secure client and MACsec, but it is not always possible.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Do some of you already have to manage these type of Pentest tool?&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;regards&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 08:55:02 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-access-control/nac-bypass-with-basilisk-automatic-ethernet-ghosting/m-p/5557779#M600554</guid>
      <dc:creator>REJR77</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2026-06-10T08:55:02Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: NAC bypass with Basilisk - Automatic Ethernet Ghosting</title>
      <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-access-control/nac-bypass-with-basilisk-automatic-ethernet-ghosting/m-p/5557781#M600555</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi REJR77,&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;The reason Basilisk works: 802.1X (EAP-TLS included) only authenticates the session at the start — it never checks that later frames really come from that endpoint. The tool bridges in transparently, lets the real device finish EAP-TLS, then rides the session by cloning its MAC and IP.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;That's also why port-security, DHCP snooping, DAI and IP Source Guard all miss it — the attacker reuses the legitimate MAC/IP, so every binding still looks consistent.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;The only hard stop is the one you named: &lt;STRONG&gt;MACsec (802.1AE/MKA, host-to-switch via Secure Client + ISE)&lt;/STRONG&gt; — it protects every frame cryptographically, so an inline device can't inject without the keys. Limit is coverage: printers, IoT, older NICs.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Where MACsec can't reach, assume bypass is possible and detect by behaviour, not identity:&lt;/P&gt;&lt;UL&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;STRONG&gt;ISE profiling + Secure Network Analytics (Stealthwatch)&lt;/STRONG&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/SPAN&gt;— flag the "printer" that suddenly scans or runs SSH/SMB, then CoA-quarantine it via pxGrid.&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Keep exposed ports on tight ACLs; shut or blackhole unused ones.&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;/UL&gt;&lt;P&gt;Bottom line: MACsec where you can, behavioural detection + physical security everywhere else. No switch add-on reliably catches a clean transparent bridge on its own — by design it looks exactly like the host it's hiding behind.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 09:02:43 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-access-control/nac-bypass-with-basilisk-automatic-ethernet-ghosting/m-p/5557781#M600555</guid>
      <dc:creator>olasupoo</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2026-06-10T09:02:43Z</dc:date>
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