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    <title>topic Re: Regarding Perfect Forward Secracy  in Network Security</title>
    <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-security/regarding-perfect-forward-secracy/m-p/1102793#M878340</link>
    <description>&lt;HTML&gt;&lt;HEAD&gt;&lt;/HEAD&gt;&lt;BODY&gt;&lt;P&gt;OK Thanks&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Will that mean that in case of PFS IPSec SA will use its own keys(not derived from IKE SA Keys) OR PFS will just protect the IPSec keys from getting broken though the IPSec keys are derived from IKE SA keys&lt;/P&gt;&lt;/BODY&gt;&lt;/HTML&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 2008 00:26:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>palsukh2002</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2008-12-30T00:26:00Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>Regarding Perfect Forward Secracy</title>
      <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-security/regarding-perfect-forward-secracy/m-p/1102789#M878333</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Can anyone explains the exact meaning of Perfect Forward Secracy in simple terms and detailed manner&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2019 14:30:23 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-security/regarding-perfect-forward-secracy/m-p/1102789#M878333</guid>
      <dc:creator>palsukh2002</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2019-03-11T14:30:23Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: Regarding Perfect Forward Secracy</title>
      <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-security/regarding-perfect-forward-secracy/m-p/1102790#M878335</link>
      <description>&lt;HTML&gt;&lt;HEAD&gt;&lt;/HEAD&gt;&lt;BODY&gt;&lt;P&gt;Have a look at this link, it will help you understand basics of IP Security &lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;A class="jive-link-custom" href="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk583/tk372/technologies_tech_note09186a0080094203.shtml" target="_blank"&gt;http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk583/tk372/technologies_tech_note09186a0080094203.shtml&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;I quote from above link!&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)-PFS ensures that a given IPsec SA key was not derived from any other secret, like some other keys. In other words, if someone breaks a key, PFS ensures that the attacker is not able to derive any other key. If PFS is not enabled, someone can potentially break the IKE SA secret key, copy all the IPsec protected data, and then use knowledge of the IKE SA secret in order to compromise the IPsec SAs setup by this IKE SA. With PFS, breaking IKE does not give an attacker immediate access to IPsec. The attacker needs to break each IPsec SA individually. The Cisco IOS IPsec implementation uses PFS group 1 (D-H 768 bit) by default.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Also reference this thread's answer well put together.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;A class="jive-link-custom" href="http://forum.cisco.com/eforum/servlet/NetProf?page=netprof&amp;amp;forum=Virtual%20Private%20Networks&amp;amp;topic=Security&amp;amp;topicID=.ee6b2b8&amp;amp;fromOutline=true&amp;amp;CommCmd=MB%3Fcmd%3Ddisplay_location%26location%3D.2cc1e33d/0" target="_blank"&gt;http://forum.cisco.com/eforum/servlet/NetProf?page=netprof&amp;amp;forum=Virtual%20Private%20Networks&amp;amp;topic=Security&amp;amp;topicID=.ee6b2b8&amp;amp;fromOutline=true&amp;amp;CommCmd=MB%3Fcmd%3Ddisplay_location%26location%3D.2cc1e33d/0&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Regards&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;I&gt;Rate any helpful posts&lt;/I&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;/BODY&gt;&lt;/HTML&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Dec 2008 15:52:50 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-security/regarding-perfect-forward-secracy/m-p/1102790#M878335</guid>
      <dc:creator>JORGE RODRIGUEZ</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2008-12-29T15:52:50Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: Regarding Perfect Forward Secracy</title>
      <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-security/regarding-perfect-forward-secracy/m-p/1102791#M878336</link>
      <description>&lt;HTML&gt;&lt;HEAD&gt;&lt;/HEAD&gt;&lt;BODY&gt;&lt;P&gt;I have an issue with this statement "The Cisco IOS IPsec implementation uses PFS group 1 (D-H 768 bit) by default."&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Does it mean that when I have a site-2-site&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;VPN between a Cisco IOS router and a Checkpoint&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Firewall, PFS group 1, by default, is enable&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;on the Cisco's side?&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;If this is true, if I disable PFS on the&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Checkpoint's side, in theory, the VPN tunnel&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;will fail right?&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;I find that the oposite is true.  In other words, if I disable PFS on the checkpoint's &lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;side, then the VPN tunnel will work; if I &lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;enable PFS on the Checkpoint's side, VPN &lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;tunnel will fail, unless I explicitly perform&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;"pfs group1" on the Cisco to get the VPN &lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;working.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Am I missing something?&lt;/P&gt;&lt;/BODY&gt;&lt;/HTML&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Dec 2008 16:05:16 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-security/regarding-perfect-forward-secracy/m-p/1102791#M878336</guid>
      <dc:creator>cisco24x7</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2008-12-29T16:05:16Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: Regarding Perfect Forward Secracy</title>
      <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-security/regarding-perfect-forward-secracy/m-p/1102792#M878338</link>
      <description>&lt;HTML&gt;&lt;HEAD&gt;&lt;/HEAD&gt;&lt;BODY&gt;&lt;P&gt;Hi David, I believe what it means  when you enable pfs and  don't specify which  DH group  be used when setting PFS type in Ipsec policy it defaults to DH group 1 768bit&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;router-3640(config)#crypto map mymap 21&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;router-3640(config)#crypto map mymap 21&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;% NOTE: This new crypto map will remain disabled until a peer&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;        and a valid access list have been configured.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;router-364(config-crypto-map)#&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;router-364(config-crypto-map)#set ?&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;  identity              Identity restriction.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;  isakmp-profile        Specify isakmp Profile&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;  peer                  Allowed Encryption/Decryption peer.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;  pfs                   Specify pfs settings&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;  security-association  Security association parameters&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;  transform-set         Specify list of transform sets in priority order&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;router-364(config-crypto-map)#set pf&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;router-364(config-crypto-map)#set pfs ?&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;  group1  D-H Group1 (768-bit modp)&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;  group2  D-H Group2 (1024-bit modp)&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;  group5  D-H Group5 (1536-bit modp)&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;  &lt;CR&gt;&lt;/CR&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;router-364(config-crypto-map)#set pfs&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;router-364(config-crypto-map)#&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;router-364(config-crypto-map)#&lt;B&gt;set pfs&lt;/B&gt; &amp;lt;- Pressed ENTER alone &lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;show run&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;crypto ipsec transform-set test esp-des esp-md5-hmac&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;!&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;crypto map mymap 21 ipsec-isakmp&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt; ! Incomplete&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt; set pfs group1&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;I&gt;If this is true, if I disable PFS on the &lt;/I&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Checkpoint's side, in theory, the VPN tunnel &lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;will fail right? &lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;I agree with you on this one,  If you have PFS enable in one end and not the other end tunnel will not form becuse policy will not match. &lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;/BODY&gt;&lt;/HTML&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Dec 2008 17:56:30 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-security/regarding-perfect-forward-secracy/m-p/1102792#M878338</guid>
      <dc:creator>JORGE RODRIGUEZ</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2008-12-29T17:56:30Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: Regarding Perfect Forward Secracy</title>
      <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-security/regarding-perfect-forward-secracy/m-p/1102793#M878340</link>
      <description>&lt;HTML&gt;&lt;HEAD&gt;&lt;/HEAD&gt;&lt;BODY&gt;&lt;P&gt;OK Thanks&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Will that mean that in case of PFS IPSec SA will use its own keys(not derived from IKE SA Keys) OR PFS will just protect the IPSec keys from getting broken though the IPSec keys are derived from IKE SA keys&lt;/P&gt;&lt;/BODY&gt;&lt;/HTML&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 2008 00:26:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.cisco.com/t5/network-security/regarding-perfect-forward-secracy/m-p/1102793#M878340</guid>
      <dc:creator>palsukh2002</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2008-12-30T00:26:00Z</dc:date>
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