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    <title>topic Re: ISE Guest with WLC in dmz in Wireless</title>
    <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/wireless/ise-guest-with-wlc-in-dmz/m-p/3790241#M5265</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;You can create a totally new VLAN just for guests and ensure that this is the Interface Group/VLAN that unauthenticated users get placed into when they associate with your open SSID (Guest).&amp;nbsp; The WLC will send Radius requests to ISE via the managament VLAN and this will arrive at Gig0 on the ISE node (ISE listens to Radius/TACACS on all active interfaces).&amp;nbsp; And then the security advice I can give you is that you host your guest portal on a different ISE interface - e.g. Gig1.&amp;nbsp; This is easily done from the ISE GUI when you create the portal.&amp;nbsp; This means that ISE won't listen on tcp/443&amp;amp;8443 on Gig0 - hence, guests won't be able to attack your ISE node kill your managment interface.&amp;nbsp; Of course if you're not careful, they can still DOS ISE on Gig1.&amp;nbsp; But you should be very restrictive in your Cisco WLC ACL's for portal user roles, and authenticated user roles.&amp;nbsp; Portal users should only be allowed to perform DNS queries and talk tcp/8443 to ISE.&amp;nbsp; Be as explicity as you can and even nail down the exact DNS servers in your ACLs!&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;For authenticated users you allow DNS, ISE and then block RFC1918 addresses, and finally, allow all the rest.&amp;nbsp; That should ensure that Guests only get to internet.&amp;nbsp; If you have a web proxy in your design, then the rule is a bit different - you don't allow all, but you simply allow all traffic to the proxy only, and then block the rest.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jan 2019 10:44:15 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Arne Bier</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2019-01-29T10:44:15Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>ISE Guest with WLC in dmz</title>
      <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/wireless/ise-guest-with-wlc-in-dmz/m-p/3788501#M5260</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Dear Experts,&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;We need design recommendation for WLC and ISE for guest access. we have 2 WLCs (SSO) and one ISE node. we want to connect the second interface of WLCs in the DMZ and ISE will be placed in the internal network.&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;Is this a doable design? what is the recommendation from a security perspective?&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;Does WLC support traffic over multiple interfaces.&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;WLC model is 5520&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;Appreciate&amp;nbsp;your quick response.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 05 Jul 2021 16:45:06 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.cisco.com/t5/wireless/ise-guest-with-wlc-in-dmz/m-p/3788501#M5260</guid>
      <dc:creator>zohaibjaved181</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2021-07-05T16:45:06Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: ISE Guest with WLC in dmz</title>
      <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/wireless/ise-guest-with-wlc-in-dmz/m-p/3788505#M5261</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Do you have any high level topology, Can this 5520 WLC dedicated to Guest Anchor ?&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 26 Jan 2019 11:06:46 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.cisco.com/t5/wireless/ise-guest-with-wlc-in-dmz/m-p/3788505#M5261</guid>
      <dc:creator>balaji.bandi</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2019-01-26T11:06:46Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: ISE Guest with WLC in dmz</title>
      <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/wireless/ise-guest-with-wlc-in-dmz/m-p/3788535#M5262</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;I am not that good with the drawings but here is attached.&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;No, it cannot be used&amp;nbsp;as Anchor controller.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 26 Jan 2019 13:03:40 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.cisco.com/t5/wireless/ise-guest-with-wlc-in-dmz/m-p/3788535#M5262</guid>
      <dc:creator>zohaibjaved181</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2019-01-26T13:03:40Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: ISE Guest with WLC in dmz</title>
      <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/wireless/ise-guest-with-wlc-in-dmz/m-p/3788536#M5263</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;I am not that good with the drawings but here is attached.&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;No, it cannot be used&amp;nbsp;as Anchor controller.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 26 Jan 2019 13:04:04 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.cisco.com/t5/wireless/ise-guest-with-wlc-in-dmz/m-p/3788536#M5263</guid>
      <dc:creator>zohaibjaved181</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2019-01-26T13:04:04Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: ISE Guest with WLC in dmz</title>
      <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/wireless/ise-guest-with-wlc-in-dmz/m-p/3788564#M5264</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;With SSO, LAG is required so you cannot use a dedicated port. That type of design would be better with N+1 where you set the port priority and assign what port an interface belongs to. With SSO, you can place the guest into a non routable vlan internally and then have another port on the switch pass that traffic to the DMZ.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 26 Jan 2019 14:03:29 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.cisco.com/t5/wireless/ise-guest-with-wlc-in-dmz/m-p/3788564#M5264</guid>
      <dc:creator>Scott Fella</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2019-01-26T14:03:29Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: ISE Guest with WLC in dmz</title>
      <link>https://community.cisco.com/t5/wireless/ise-guest-with-wlc-in-dmz/m-p/3790241#M5265</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;You can create a totally new VLAN just for guests and ensure that this is the Interface Group/VLAN that unauthenticated users get placed into when they associate with your open SSID (Guest).&amp;nbsp; The WLC will send Radius requests to ISE via the managament VLAN and this will arrive at Gig0 on the ISE node (ISE listens to Radius/TACACS on all active interfaces).&amp;nbsp; And then the security advice I can give you is that you host your guest portal on a different ISE interface - e.g. Gig1.&amp;nbsp; This is easily done from the ISE GUI when you create the portal.&amp;nbsp; This means that ISE won't listen on tcp/443&amp;amp;8443 on Gig0 - hence, guests won't be able to attack your ISE node kill your managment interface.&amp;nbsp; Of course if you're not careful, they can still DOS ISE on Gig1.&amp;nbsp; But you should be very restrictive in your Cisco WLC ACL's for portal user roles, and authenticated user roles.&amp;nbsp; Portal users should only be allowed to perform DNS queries and talk tcp/8443 to ISE.&amp;nbsp; Be as explicity as you can and even nail down the exact DNS servers in your ACLs!&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;For authenticated users you allow DNS, ISE and then block RFC1918 addresses, and finally, allow all the rest.&amp;nbsp; That should ensure that Guests only get to internet.&amp;nbsp; If you have a web proxy in your design, then the rule is a bit different - you don't allow all, but you simply allow all traffic to the proxy only, and then block the rest.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jan 2019 10:44:15 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.cisco.com/t5/wireless/ise-guest-with-wlc-in-dmz/m-p/3790241#M5265</guid>
      <dc:creator>Arne Bier</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2019-01-29T10:44:15Z</dc:date>
    </item>
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