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Why doesnt IPSec support multicast traffic?

n.poole
Level 1
Level 1

If IPSec is a tunnel, why cant you define multicast traffic in an ACL to be protected?

1 Accepted Solution

Accepted Solutions

gfullage
Cisco Employee
Cisco Employee

IPSec is a standard, and there is nothing in the standard that allows for multicast or broadcast traffic to go through it.

Specifically, the IPSec RFC (ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2401.txt) states things like:

A security association is uniquely identified by a triple consisting

of a Security Parameter Index (SPI), an IP Destination Address, and a

security protocol (AH or ESP) identifier. In principle, the

Destination Address may be a unicast address, an IP broadcast

address, or a multicast group address. However, IPsec SA management

mechanisms currently are defined only for unicast SAs.

and

The receiver-orientation of the Security Association implies that, in

the case of unicast traffic, the destination system will normally

select the SPI value. By having the destination select the SPI

value, there is no potential for manually configured Security

Associations to conflict with automatically configured (e.g., via a

key management protocol) Security Associations or for Security

Associations from multiple sources to conflict with each other. For

multicast traffic, there are multiple destination systems per

multicast group. So some system or person will need to coordinate

among all multicast groups to select an SPI or SPIs on behalf of each

multicast group and then communicate the group's IPsec information to

all of the legitimate members of that multicast group via mechanisms

not defined here.

Multiple senders to a multicast group SHOULD use a single Security

Association (and hence Security Parameter Index) for all traffic to

that group when a symmetric key encryption or authentication

algorithm is employed. In such circumstances, the receiver knows only

that the message came from a system possessing the key for that

multicast group. In such circumstances, a receiver generally will

not be able to authenticate which system sent the multicast traffic.

Specifications for other, more general multicast cases are deferred

to later IPsec documents.

Sorry to quote RFC's at you, but we simply follow the standard and the standard didn't support this. You can work around it by defining a GRE/IPSec connection, but all that's really doing is encapsulating the broadcast/multicast into a unicast GRe packet first, then encrypting that unicast packet.

View solution in original post

1 Reply 1

gfullage
Cisco Employee
Cisco Employee

IPSec is a standard, and there is nothing in the standard that allows for multicast or broadcast traffic to go through it.

Specifically, the IPSec RFC (ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2401.txt) states things like:

A security association is uniquely identified by a triple consisting

of a Security Parameter Index (SPI), an IP Destination Address, and a

security protocol (AH or ESP) identifier. In principle, the

Destination Address may be a unicast address, an IP broadcast

address, or a multicast group address. However, IPsec SA management

mechanisms currently are defined only for unicast SAs.

and

The receiver-orientation of the Security Association implies that, in

the case of unicast traffic, the destination system will normally

select the SPI value. By having the destination select the SPI

value, there is no potential for manually configured Security

Associations to conflict with automatically configured (e.g., via a

key management protocol) Security Associations or for Security

Associations from multiple sources to conflict with each other. For

multicast traffic, there are multiple destination systems per

multicast group. So some system or person will need to coordinate

among all multicast groups to select an SPI or SPIs on behalf of each

multicast group and then communicate the group's IPsec information to

all of the legitimate members of that multicast group via mechanisms

not defined here.

Multiple senders to a multicast group SHOULD use a single Security

Association (and hence Security Parameter Index) for all traffic to

that group when a symmetric key encryption or authentication

algorithm is employed. In such circumstances, the receiver knows only

that the message came from a system possessing the key for that

multicast group. In such circumstances, a receiver generally will

not be able to authenticate which system sent the multicast traffic.

Specifications for other, more general multicast cases are deferred

to later IPsec documents.

Sorry to quote RFC's at you, but we simply follow the standard and the standard didn't support this. You can work around it by defining a GRE/IPSec connection, but all that's really doing is encapsulating the broadcast/multicast into a unicast GRe packet first, then encrypting that unicast packet.