The keys used for encryption are derived from the PMK that has been mutually derived during the EAP authentication section. This PMK is sent to the authenticator in the EAP success message, but is not forwarded to the supplicant because the supplicant has derived its own copy of the PMK.
1. The authenticator sends an EAPOL-Key frame containing an authenticator nonce (ANonce), which is a random number generated by the authenticator.
a. The supplicant derives a PTK from the ANonce and supplicant nonce (SNonce), which is a random number generated by the client/supplicant.
2. The supplicant sends an EAPOL-Key frame containing an SNonce, the RSN information element from the (re)association request frame, and an MIC.
a. The authenticator derives a PTK from the ANonce and SNonce and validates the MIC in the EAPOL-Key frame.
3. The authenticator sends an EAPOL-Key frame containing the ANonce, the RSN information element from its beacon or probe response messages; the MIC, determining whether to install the temporal keys; and the encapsulated group temporal key (GTK), the multicast encryption key.
4. The supplicant sends an EAPOL-Key frame to confirm that the temporal keys are installed.