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03-20-2013 11:25 AM - edited 02-21-2020 06:46 PM
Hi all,
I just got off the phone with customer that has passed a security scan check from a third party vendor. One of the vulnerebilities mentioned in the report is as follows:
I know that only the IPsec client VPN uses aggressive mode to negotiate Phase I. So my question is how can I convince my customer to continue using the IPsec VPN? Is there anything I can do to reduce the risk of using this type of remote accesses. Also, am I having the same issue if I use SSL Client based VPN?
Regards,
Marty
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03-20-2013 11:15 PM
Hello,
Ikev1 HUB running aggressive mode sends his PSK hash in the second packet along with his DH public value.
That's indeed a well-know protocol weakness.
To be able to act on that, U would have to be on the path to capture this flow in order to brute force the hash [ which is not obvious - but not impossible]
This issue is seriously mitigated by enabling XAUTH [User authentication].
Xauth is happening after DH , therefore under encryption.
Assuming strong password policy is in use, it's then very very very complex to find the right combination of user/password.
Ikev2 is way more secure in that regard and it's the right path.
Cheers,
Olivier
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03-21-2013 11:06 AM
I totally agreed with Olivier
Here is some information for future reference:
IPsec client (legacy):
Configuring IPSec Between Cisco IOS Routers and Cisco VPN Client Using Entrust Certificates
Digital Certificates/PKI for IPSec VPNs
AnyConnect:
ASA 8.4+ Configuring AnyConnect VPN Client Connections
IOS FlexVPN Deployment: AnyConnect IKEv2 Remote Access with EAP-MD5
HTH.
Portu.

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03-20-2013 12:44 PM
Hi,
IKE agressive mode has the well-known vulnerability of exchanging identities in cleartext.
You can use certificate authentication instead of pre-shared keys, or you can migrate to SSL VPN that doesn't have the agressive mode vulnerability.
Hope this helps
Mashal
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03-20-2013 11:15 PM
Hello,
Ikev1 HUB running aggressive mode sends his PSK hash in the second packet along with his DH public value.
That's indeed a well-know protocol weakness.
To be able to act on that, U would have to be on the path to capture this flow in order to brute force the hash [ which is not obvious - but not impossible]
This issue is seriously mitigated by enabling XAUTH [User authentication].
Xauth is happening after DH , therefore under encryption.
Assuming strong password policy is in use, it's then very very very complex to find the right combination of user/password.
Ikev2 is way more secure in that regard and it's the right path.
Cheers,
Olivier

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03-21-2013 01:33 AM
Thank you guys!
Cheers
Marty
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03-21-2013 11:06 AM
I totally agreed with Olivier
Here is some information for future reference:
IPsec client (legacy):
Configuring IPSec Between Cisco IOS Routers and Cisco VPN Client Using Entrust Certificates
Digital Certificates/PKI for IPSec VPNs
AnyConnect:
ASA 8.4+ Configuring AnyConnect VPN Client Connections
IOS FlexVPN Deployment: AnyConnect IKEv2 Remote Access with EAP-MD5
HTH.
Portu.
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03-21-2013 05:46 PM
The links are fantastic. Thank Javier!
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03-21-2013 07:03 PM
You are welcome!!
Please rate any helpful posts and mark this post as answered
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04-08-2013 09:06 AM
Hello Javier,
I believe this vulnerability does not impact site to site VPNs.. specially when we are running over MPLS cloud instead of internet.. please confirm. I am facing a similar situation and need to present solution to customer security board.
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04-08-2013 10:14 AM
Hello,
Yes you are correct. The reason for that is because LAN-to-LAN tunnels with pre-shared-keys use ISAKMP Main Mode.
So the key is protected during the exchange.
HTH.
